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This article traces the constitutional development for closer national-state coopera-
tion in crime control, indicating the legal methods sanctioned, and suggests the
course of future action in the federal system.-EDITOR.
"... Let a spirit of national as well as local patriotism once pre-
vail; let unfounded jealousies cease, and we shall hear no more about
the impossibility of harmonious action between the national and state
governments in a matter in which they have a mutual interest."I
There exists extreme decentralization in many fields of gov-
ernmental administration in the United States as a result of the
division of Constitutional authority between the states and the
national government. One of the most important of these is the
administration of justice-the detection, apprehension, and pros-
ecution of persons who commit criminal actions.
As a result, the actions which other nations may take in the
field of criminal law by a centralized authority must be done
under two systems in the United States if the enforcement pow-
ers are fully exercised. Under the classic division of powers,
criminal law enforcement operations have fallen into three main
categories, first, the sphere in which the states seem to have full
and complete power, second, the sphere in which the national
government is supreme and has plenary control, and third the
twilight zone in which the states are either forbidden to act, or
are incompetent to act, and in which both the state and national
governments must work together if the gaps in ineffective crime
control are closed. The complications resulting from these
spheres of legal action have demonstrated an increasing need
for greater and more extensive cooperation between the state
and national governments, and among the states themselves.
Is the constitutional system of divided responsibility suffi-
ciently flexible to assure a coordinated program for the preven-
tion and control of crime?
The states are the major unit for the control of the adminis-
tration of criminal laws and are responsible for most all criminal
law enforcement.2 The official charged with the enforcement of
1 Ex parte Biebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1879), 387.
2 For a general discussion of the administration of justice at the local government
level, see Arthur C. Millspaugh, Local Democracy and Crime Control (Washington,
D. C., 1936).
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the law has for centuries been the sheriff, who is the chief
authority for rural crime control.' The sheriff to this day is a
political officer and his connections with local politics and his
numerous civil duties tend to discourage any desire he might
have to be more active in police work.4 His term of office is
short, and he is frequently ineligible to succeed himself. This
condition prevents him from acquiring any great skill as a
crime detector. Whenever sheriffs have been asked about their
law-enforcement duties, they have admitted their limited interest
in this portion of their work and their preoccupation with their
many civil functions.5 These factors have been one of the con-
tributing elements toward the steady growth of state police sys-
tems operating throughout the entire jurisdiction of the state.
Every state has established state-wide patrol or police units
operating upon the major state highways, and has organized
scientific laboratories to assist their own officers as well as local
peace officers in the fight against the criminal. The radio has
been utilized to make communications with patrolmen and local
peace officers speedier and more effective. In some of the states
where reorganization attempts have been effective, departments
of justice have been instrumental in formulating plans to coordi-
nate the work of detection, apprehension, and prosecution.
Even though the states were completely centralized for crim-
inal law enforcement, the national crime problem would be only
partially solved." The states themselves are too small and too
numerous to satisfy all the requirements of effective crime con-
trol. The automobile makes it possible to enter, leave, or cross
a state in a matter of hours or even minutes, where it was for-
merly a matter of slow and weary days. Modern gangdom plans
a crime in one state, executes it in another, and either returns
to the first state, or goes into some remote region for the needed
cooling-off period.7 Thus, the territorial range of criminal oper-
ations is interstate and national in character, and crime control
methods must be interstate and national also if the heavy toll
against lives and property is to be reduced and controlled. The
pursuit of a criminal cannot stop because of an artificial city,
county, or state line.8 A clue which is found in one jurisdiction
must be followed up in still another. In short, the complete evi-
S The Missouri Association for Criminal Justice, The Missouri Criw Survey, (New
York, 1926), p. 59.
4 Bruce Smith, The State Police (New York, 1925), p. 18.
5 The Missouri Crine Survey, op. oit., p. 65.
6 Arthur 0. Millspaugh, Grime Control by the National Government (Washington,
D. C., 1937), p. 46.
7 Ibid.
8See W. Berge, "Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle", 30
Michigan Law Beview (1931), pp. 238 ff.
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dence in both major and minor crimes may be spread from one
coast to the other, and from Canada to Mexico.
What, then, are the constitutional devices which make effective
crime control possible in the United States ?
The historic constitutional device for federal cooperation in
crime control resulting from limited jurisdictions is the method
of interstate rendition or extradition of criminals or persons
accused of crime. This scheme of federal cooperation dates from
early colonial days and as early as 1643. The right of an
asylum state or country to arrest and surrender a fugitive from
justice of another nation or state had been recognized at that
early date and the courts in this country followed the practices
announced in decisions by the courts in England. This agree-
ment in colonial days apparently did not give any discretion to
the magistrate of the government where the offender was found.
He was bound to arrest the offender and deliver him, upon the
production of the certificate under which the offender was de-
manded.9
In 1781 the colonies united against the mother country under
the Articles of Confederation. Evidence of the importance of
the problem of inter-colonial crime is the provision respecting
fugitives from justice."
If any person guilty of or charged with treason, felony, or other high
misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from justice, and be found in any
of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the Governor or Execu-
tive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and re-
moved to the State having jurisdiction of his offence.
This agreement was made in the absence of a strong, central
government vested with the power of enforcement. Consequently,
it had little more force than any other treaty between States.
The return of a criminal fugitive depended almost entirely upon
the discretion of the government of the asylum state. When the
Constitution was adopted, however, the relations among the
states were fundamentally changed. A new government was
organized which was intended to knit the loosely bound com-
munities into a firmer union. The system provided a unique
experiment in constitutional government. Two governments
over the same and contiguous territory was unusual,"' and the
settlement of conflicting problems arising under it have since
9 See WItthrop History of New England, 1630-49 (Hosmer ed. 1908), vol. 2, pp.
100, 104-5. Also, John Bassett Moore, Extradition (1891), vol. 2, pp. 819 ff. H. S.
Toy and E. E. Shepherd, "The Problem of Fugitive Felons and Witnesses", 1 Law
and Contemporary Problems (1934) p. 418. Ex parte Kentucky v. Dennison, 24
Howard 66 (1861).
10 Artides of Confederation, Article IV, par. 2.
11 Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859), 516.
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provided the elements for a vast proportion of American Con-
stitutional Law. The Constitution enumerated the powers for
the central government, and reserved all powers, not delegated,
to the states and to the people. Certain definite powers were
conferred upon three coordinate branches of the central govern-
ment which in turn gave rise to implications of power not other-
wise expressed in the document.' 2
Among the powers of the central government was one dealing
with the subject of interstate rendition. With some slight
changes, the provisions of the extradition compact of the Articles
of Confederation were embodied in the Constitution, 3 and later
extended by an act of Congress. 14
A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime,
who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on
demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the
crime.
A statute of 1794 made it the duty of the governor of the
asylum state, upon requisition of the executive of the state of pri-
mary jurisdiction over the fugitive and his crime, to honor the de-
mand and issue his warrant authorizing arrest and removal. But
in Ex parte Kentucky v. Dennison,'5 the Supreme Court declared
that a federal court was powerless to force the governor of
Ohio to honor the requisition of the executive in Kentucky. It
was held that while extradition between the states is provided
for in the Constitution and the laws enacted under it were
supreme, if the governor of an asylum state refused to discharge
this duty, there was no power delegated to the central govern-
ment, either through the judicial department or any other de-
partment to use coercion to compel him to act. This meant that
the central government was powerless to enforce its own law,
that is, through state officers. It meant that the matter of
extradition in any particular case rested entirely upon the dis-
cretion of the governor of the asylum state. And if he should
choose to consider any extraneous evidence, political or other-
wise, which had a bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the
accused, or any other facts actually outside his province, he
might do so with impunity. 16 The governors of the states thus
held the key to control until 1934 when President Roosevelt
12 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).
13 Constitution of the United States, Art. IV, see. 2, par. 2.
14 Act of Feb. 12, 1793. 1 Stat. 302.
15 The lower federal courts have held that extradition proceedings are controlled
entirely by the federal laws, and any state laws on the subject are only in aid of
the federal law. See U. S. ex rel MeCline v. Meyering, 75 Fed. (2d) 716.
16 Toy and Shepherd, op. cit., p. 419.
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approved a bill making it unlawful for any person to flee from
one state to another for the purpose of avoiding prosecution or
the giving of testimony in certain cases. 7 This law made it
possible for national agents to pursue and apprehend criminals
without regard to the provisions and technicalities of interstate
rendition.
There is a second device for federal cooperation in crime
control which has been seldom used-the interstate compact.
The Constitution provides that "No State shall, without the con-
sent of Congress .. . enter into any agreement or compact with
another state or with a foreign power... 8
The possible value of this somewhat dormant provision was
in part recognized in 1934 by authorizing in advance agreements
or compacts on the subject of crime control. This law provides
for "cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention
of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal
laws and policies, and to establish such agencies, joint or other-
wise, as they deem desirable for making effective such agree-
ments and compacts."19
These two constitutional devices have thus authorized inter-
state cooperation in the administration of justice. However, it
is evident that difficulties arise when action must be taken which
involves two or more states not having a common boundary. It
is not difficult for New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, for
example, to cooperate under the compact and rendition clauses
of the Constitution. But it is another matter when one or more
of these states is required to operate in conjunction with Illinois
or California. The element of time is all important in criminal
apprehension, and delays arise during the time required to
transmit formal papers to secure the arrest of persons wanted
in New York who happen to be in California or who are believed
to be in California. It is true that the agents of these states do
transmit information and cooperate with one another in holding
criminals until the necessary legal paths are smoothed for
extradition. But the history of interstate rendition is over-
flowing with examples of snarls among the states on this very
question.
17 Act of May 18, 1934. 48 Stat. 782.
18 Constitution, Art. I, see. 10, par. 3.
19 See Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, "The Compact Clause in the Con-
stitution: A Study in Interstate Adjustments," 34 Yale Law Journal (1925):
Marshall E. Dimock and George C. S. Benson, Can Interstate Compacts Succeed?
(Chicago, 1937); Jane Perry Clark, "Interstate Compacts", 50 Political Science
Quarterly (1935), pp. 502 ff. See also, Act of June 6, 1934. 48 Stat. 909. Thirty-six




The greatest strides in federal cooperation in crime control
have been via the constitutional jurisdiction of the national
government over crime itself. The Constitution has delegated
certain powers to the Congress, and one writer has stated that
the criminal statutes of the national government can be traced
to more than 25 provisions of the document.20 Certain of the
delegated powers relate directly to the field of crime control.
Under these powers, Congress has enacted a voluminous criminal
code, based upon provisions specifically relating to crimes, and
to other provisions which authorize such legislation by indirec-
tion. The Federal Criminal Code rests upon such provisions
as the powers over treason, piracies, and felonies on the high
seas and against international law, counterfeiting United States
coin -and securities, naturalization and immigration, uniform
bankruptcy, post offices and post roads, the power to enforce
laws by military units, and the tax and commerce powers.21
But how could the massive Code he erected from the meager
constitutional framework? In addition to the enumerated
powers, Congress has power "to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers..."22 And the Congress was not slow to take advantage
of this necessary and proper clause to enact-criminal statutes,
for this provision has been the basis for most of the law en-
forcement authority of the national government.23
These national laws, based upon national powers, find their
statutory anchorage in two main sources: the powers over com-
merce, and the power to tax.24 These powers have been instru-
mental in not only increasing tremendously the national powers
over criminal law enforcement, but have made it possible for
greater and more effective federal cooperation in the war
against crime.25 It is under the powers over commerce that the
greatest progress has been made in federal-state cooperation.
Under the commerce power laws have been predicated upon pre-
viously existing state laws. Certain acts have been prohibited
20B. Thorn Lord, "Criminal Power of the Federal and State Governments",
New Jersey Conference on Crime, 1955 (Abstract of Addresses), p. 150.
21 These provisions have been conveniently classified as follows: (1) crimes
against the law of nations; (2) crimes against the sovereignty of the U. S.; (3)
crimes against public justice; (4) crimes against the person; (5) crimes against
property. See J. E. Hoover, "Some Legal Aspects of Interstate Crime", 21
Minnesota Law Review (1937), p. 235.
22 Constitution, Art. 1, see. 8, par. 18.
23 Bruce Smith, Police Systems in the U. S. (New York, 1940), pp. 206-10. U. ..
Government Manual, 1947.
24 Constitution, Art. 1, see. 8, pars. 1 & 3.
25 "Federal Control over Crime-the Scope of Power to Regulate Crime under
the Commerce Clause", 32 Michigan Law Review (1934), pp. 378 ff. J. Rodgers,
"Federal Criminal Statutes-Validity", 28 Journal of CriminaZ Law and Criminol-
ogy (1936), pp. 762-5.
[Vol 39
CRIME CONTROL
as illegal and offenders must suffer the penalties of the national
law and in the national courts. These laws tend to prevent or at
least discourage interstate crime, or crime on a nation-wide
scale. The Supreme Court has held, in considering the commerce
clause, that the right of the citizen to use these facilities -does
not give him the right to abuse them.26 Thus, when Congress
sought to stamp out a declared evil and prevent the use of inter-
state comnerce in the selling of lottery tickets, the Court held
valid the power over commerce among the states and stated that
carrying lottery tickets was commerce.27 This decision was the
result of testing the validity of the national law, which was, in
effect, an aid to those states which themselves had outlawed the
sale of lottery tickets within their own boundaries, but were
helpless in preventing an influx of lottery tickets from without.
The Court upheld the right of the national government to pro-
hibit articles from being transported from state to state to
protect the people of all the states. Likewise, in construing the
respective powers of the state and national governments over
the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Court found that Congress
had "... considered the nature and character of our dual system
of government, State and Nation, and instead of absolutely pro-
hibiting, had so conformed its regulation as to produce coopera-
tion between the local and national forces of the government
Y Y26
The commerce power was expanded further to aid the states
in controlling the practice of stealing automobiles and their sub-
sequent interstate transportation. Cars were stolen in one state
and transported over the highways into another state to be sold.
The practice had grown to such proportions *that the states
were unable to deal with it effectively. There was some coopera-
tion among the states in an extra-legal way, generally informal
practices among the state and local police promoting mutual aid.
But these methods were cumbersome and often difficult to con-
clude. These conditions were instrumental in forcing the passage
of the National Stolen Motor Vehicle Act by Congress. 29 The
Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate interstate
commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of
such commerce as an agency which promoted immorality, dis-
honesty, or the "spread of any evil or harm to the people of
other states from the state of origin," 30 and that Congress was
26Hoce v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308 (1913); Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903);
Cam neti v. U. 8., 242 U. S. 470 (1917); Brooks v. U. 8., 267 U. S. 432 (1925);
U. S. v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100 (1941).
27 Champion V. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
28 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. By. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917), 331.
29 Act of Oct. 29, 1919. 41 Stat. 324.
30 Brooks v. U. S., 267 U. S. 432 (1925), 436.
1949]
A. C. BRECKENIIDGE
merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public
within the field of interstate action.
The quick passage of the machines into another state helps to conceal
the trail of the thieves, gets the stolen property into another policejurisdiction, and facilitates the finding of a safer place in which to
dispose of the booty at a good price. This is a gross misuse of inter-
state transportation by anyone with knowledge of the theft because of
its harmful results and its defeat of the property rights of those whose
machines against their will are taken into other jurisdictions.31
This law was later amended to include other stolen property,3 2
and it tends to discourage the interstate transportation of
stolen property: thus it becomes an aid to the states in the en-
forcement of their law.
Another example of national action to supplement state law
is the anti-racketeering statute.3 This law made it a felony to
obtain the payment of money or other valuable " considerations"
or the purchase or rental of property or other "prospective
services" by the use of or the threat to use "force, violence, or
coercion" when this conduct is "in connection with or in relation
to any act in any way or in any degree affecting" interstate or
foreign commerce. This has struck a heavy blow at the web of
nationally organized rackets.
One of the most highly publicized examples of the use of the
interstate commerce power by the national government in the
administration of justice was the legislation to control and pre-
vent kidnapping. The first law on the subject was passed in 1932
after state laws were found to be inadequate without being sup-
plemented by national law.3 4 The United States Circuit Court
of Appeals considered that power to regulate commerce among
the states included the power to prohibit the use of it to "facili-
tate wrongful injurious acts or practices . . .To prohibit the
use of the channels of interstate commerce to facilitate the
crime of kidnapping is clearly within the power of Congress.' 3"
A law of 1910 forbids the transportation in interstate commerce
of women for immoral purposes. When considered in the Hoke
case, 36 it was maintained that if interstate transportation was
used to fortify or sanction wrongs that its use could be properly
denied under the penalty of national law.
31 Ibid., pp. 438, 439.
32 Act of May 22, 1934, as amended by Act of August 3, 1939. 48 Stat. 794.
33 Act of June 18, 1934. 48 Stat. 979. Sustained in U. S. v. Gramlich, 19 Fed.
Supp. 422.
34 Act of June 22, 1932. 47 Stat. 326. Amended by Act of May 18, 1934. 48
Stat. 781.
35 Bailey v. U. 8., 74 Fed. (2d) 451 (1934), 453.




Our dual form of government has its perplexities, State and Nation
having different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said; but it must
be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to the
states and those conferred on the nation are adapted to be exercised,
whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general wel-
fare, material and moral.37
The national government has thus promoted and fostered fed-
eral cooperation through the indirect sanction of the commerce
power. While this power has been the root of the most extensive
cooperation, the power of the national government to lay and
collect taxes has provided still another technique. The Con-
stitution provides that Congress shall have the power "to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States."3 8 Thus, if the government obtains compliance
with its tax laws, it becomes necessary and proper to prescribe
penalties for non-payment of taxes. Likewise it is necessary for
the government to maintain a force of trained officers to detect
tax evasions and attempt the prevention of tax violations. It is
by this route that the national government entered the field of
narcotics control, previously a problem for purely local and state
law enforcement. Through an elaborate system of licensing
based upon the taxing power, the national government has
brought the narcotic traffic under control, and yet it remains an
aid to the previously enacted state laws controlling the use of
narcotics. The Supreme Court sanctioned this kind of coopera-
tion in upholding the taxing power of the national government
as it applied to bank notes.8 9 When the Court was confronted
with an attack on the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914,40 it
maintained that Congress could not, however, in the exercise of
this power, exert authority which was wholly reserved to the
states, and it refused the request that the Court was bound to
inquire into the motives for the exercise of the taxing power.
If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise
of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be
invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it.41
It is emphasized that these tax laws provide criminal penalties
for non-compliance, and it can be seen that they are direct
auxiliaries to state law enforcement. In each case the vice aimed
at is beyond the adequate and effective control of the states act-
ing singly.
37 Hoke V. U. S., 322.
38 Condtitution, Art. 1, sec. 8, par. 1.
39 Yeazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wallace 533 (1869).
40 Act of Dec. 17, 1914. 38 Stat. 788.
41 U. S. v. Dorenus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919), 93.
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The exercise of authority presumes the enactment of laws.
But mere statutory enactment does not, ipso facto, mean com-
pliance with those laws. The question may be asked: how can
these laws be effectively administered? Consider, for example,
the law which made it a felony for a criminal to cross a state line
to avoid prosecution.42 This law has the effect of avoiding the
complexities of the rendition process, and it may have the effect
of reducing rendition to a minimum of operation. This fleeing
felon law makes it easier to remove the criminal wherever he
may be found.43 After a criminal has been released from the
national authorities, there is nothing that prevents the state
authorities from prosecuting him if he has violated a state law.
And this practice works both ways. The prison officials in both
state and national governments generally inform the state and
local police when it is about to release a prisoner. In this manner
the prisoner can be "picked up" if he is wanted by one of the
other authorities. Much time is saved, at the expense of the
criminal, and he is forced to face trial for any previous action
which violated a law of another govermental unit--city, state, or
nation. It has long been settled that the provisions of a national
and state law making the same act a crime against both gov-
ernments are not a violation of the guarantees of the right to
freedom from governmental aggression-from being put twice
in jeopardy of life and limb for the same offense.44 Almost every
citizen owes allegiance to two sovereigns in the United States
and he may therefore be liable to punishment for an infraction
of the laws of either or the same act may be a violation of the
laws of both.45 In the Siebold case, the Supreme Court an-
nounced that there was nothing in the Constitution to forbid the
kind of cooperation existing in the enforcement of the election
laws. On the contrary, it recognized that there was a kind of
silent sanction for such cooperation whenever the Congress
"deems it expedient to interfere merely to alter or add to ex-
isting regulations of the state' 4' on that subject. Cooperation
42 Act of May 18, 1934. 48 Stat. 782.
43 While the rule in international law applying to extradition provides that the
criminal may be tried only for the crime for which he was extradited, such a limita-
tion does not apply in interstate rendition in the U. S.
44 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1879).
45 It is interesting to note that in an early Ohio case involving the prosecution of
an offense against violation of counterfeiting laws the U. S. Supreme Court held
that the states were without power to prosecute cases of that kind, but speaking of
the subject of possible double jeopardy, it said that "nothing can be more repug-
nant or contradictory than two punishments for the same act. It would be a mockery
of justice and a reproach to civilization. It would bring our system of government
into merited contempt." Fox v. State of Ohio, 5 Howard 410 (1847), 437. It is
obvious that this line of reasoning was not followed as applied to double jeopardy.
46 Op. oit. 392.
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was necessary in the eyes of the Court for "if the two govern-
ments had an entire equality of jurisdiction, there might be an
intrinsic difficulty in cooperation.' '4
When the question was raised in relation to a concurrent
authority over prohibition of intoxicants, the Supreme Court
found in the Lanza case 48 that the state and national govern-
ments derived their power from different sources, each of which
was capable of dealing with the same subject matter and within
the same territory. Each government could enact prohibition
laws without interference from the other, limited only by the
provisions of the eighteenth amendment then in force. Each
government could determine what acts constituted an offense
against its peace, and, in so doing, exercised its own sovereign
powers and not those of the other. Therefore, an act denounced
as a crime by both the national and state governments was an
offense against the peace and dignity of both and could be
punished by each. Such procedure was not double jeopardy, even
though a person might by the same act be prosecuted by two
governments. The Court did offer a means to prevent double
prosecutions, suggesting that the national government could for-
bid prosecutions in its courts if the same person had been prose-
cuted and convicted for the same act in the state courts.49
It is obvious that the most successful cooperation must result
from or be the outgrowth of many voluntary and mutual agree-
ments or understandings among the administrative and judicial
officers of all levels of government. Most of these agreements
are extra-legal and purely moral obligations. Generally speak-
ing, there is seldom much friction arising from national-state,
interstate, and national-local agreements of this kind. But this
does not mean that disagreements, frictions, and jealousies do
not arise from any such arrangements.
This kind of cooperation prevails in the enforcement of the
laws against kidnapping.50 It is difficult to determine accurately
after the disappearance of a person, presumed to have been
kidnapped, whether or not he has been taken across a state line,
thus legalizing the operations of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation. The national law allows a lapse of seven days, after
which time it is assumed that the kidnapped person must have
been transported across a state line and thus taken into inter-
state commerce. During this interval the burden of the work of
4 Ibid.
48 U. S. v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 (1922), 385.
49 Ibid.
50Horace L. Bomar, Jr., "The Lindbergh Law", 1 Law and Contemporary
,problems (1934), pp. 441 ff.
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investigation falls largely upon the state and local officers, even
though it may later develop that the kidnapped person has been
carried across a state boundary. After the national officers have
"officially" entered the case, the state officers generally continue
to assist in the search, because the states have laws against kid-
napping as well, and some. of them are more severe than the
national law.
In the case of violation of the Fugitive Felon Act the state and
local officials invariably furnish the original information to the
national officers, for prosecution under the law must result from
a flight across a state line to avoid prosecution by a state. The
Department of Justice has indicated that cooperation among the
several levels of government is highly successful.51 The fact
remains, however, that the success of such a plan rests upon the
mutual good faith of national, state, and local enforcement offi-
cials, and that it is a voluntary undertaking.
This cooperation extends to the prosecution of offenders as
well as to the process of detection and apprehension. In the
notable Ponzi case 52 the Supreme Court held that cooperation by
the national and state prosecuting authorities need not neces-
sarily rest upon statute. In this case one Ponzi was serving a
sentence in a federal prison located in the state of Massachusetts.
He had violated a state law piior to his prosecution and impris-
onment by the national government, and through an agreement
between the Department of Justice and the local authorities,
Ponzi was produced from day to day in the state court where he
was tried for larceny. He was acquitted for this crime, however.
In another case, the national government was still more accom-
modating.53 One Chapman was serving a term in the federal
prison at Atlanta for robbery. He was transferred by an order
of the Attorney General of the United States to a state prison in
Connecticut. He, like Ponzi, had violated a state law and was
produced from day to day in the state court for trial. He was
tried and convicted on a murder charge, an action committed
during an escape from prison. After the conviction in the state
court, President Coolidge commuted Chapman's sentence and
the state penalty, which was death, was carried out. It was
suggested that the President did not have the legal authority to
honor the habeas corpus of the state judge and allow the trial of
Chapman. However, the federal court hearing the case pointed
out that the custody of federal prisoners and their disposition
51 See Jane Perry Clark, Rise of a New Federalism (New York, 1938), pp. 129 ff.
52 Ponei v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254 (1922).
53 This case, Chapman v. Scott, 10 Fed. (2d) 156 (1925), was suggested in read-
ing E. D. Fite, Government by Cooperation (New York, 1932), pp. 41-49.
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was charged with the Attorney General and that it was not
uncommon for the national goyernment to "board" its prison-
ers at state prisons from time to time. But it remains a ques-
tion where the President found the legal power to allow the state
to try the prisoner already serving in federal custody.54
In both the Ponzi and Chapman cases the procedure was a
matter of voluntary cooperation between the national and state
authorities exercised at the discretion of the President of the
United States. But the Supreme Court found that "... there
is no express authority authorizing the transfer of a federal
prisoner to a state court for such purposes. Yet we have no
doubt that it exists .. "55 For the United States to surrender
its prisoners to the states in such a manner was a concern for
the national government alone. This procedure of voluntary
arrangements has been followed in numerous other cases of
record.56 The meaning of these decisions is that the courts of the
national and state governments rightfully practice comity and
mutual assistance to promote due and orderly. procedure. 57
Chief Justice Taft, who delivered the decision for the Court
said that "this arrangement of comity between the two govern-
ments works in no way to the prejudice of the prisoner of either
sovereignty. 5 8 The Chief Justice opened the opinion in these
words:
We live in a jurisdiction of two sovereignties, each having its own sys-
tem of courts to declare and enforce its laws in common territory. It
would be impossible for such courts to fulfill their respective functions
without embarrassing conflicts unless rules were adopted by them to
avoid it. The people for whose benefit .these two systems are main-
tained are deeply interested that each system shall be effective and
unhindered in its vindication of its laws. The situation requires there-
fore, not only definite rules fixing the powers of the courts in cases ofjurisdiction over the same persons and things in actual litigation, but
also a spirit of reciprocal comity and mutual assistance to promote due
and orderly procedure."9
Thus the two seemingly sovereign and independent govern-
ments are not absolute in their respective spheres, but are re-
garded as cooperative units, performing their tasks through
coordinated effort. The Supreme Court has generally always
regarded any kind of voluntary cooperation as completely within
the legal bounds of the Constitution, and it has sanctioned the
attempts by Congress to legislate crime out of existence even
54 Chapman v. Scott.
55 Ponci v. Fessenden, 261-262.
56 See Fite, op. cit., p. 87.





when it invaded "cherished rights" in local self-government.
Within the legal bounds of the Constitution these various tech-
niques permit cooperative government with the states assisting
the national government, and the national government aiding the
states in a problem of mutual interest. The no-man's land of
governmental operation in crime control is thus more effectively
closed, and the easy channels of escape are being gradually
eradicated.
While most of the cooperation has resulted from the neces-
sities of the time, the extension of national laws as aids to the
state and local units has been enhanced through the efforts of
several official and unofficial agencies. For example, the United
States Department of Justice serves as a clearing house of
information serving national, state, and local enforcement
officers. The Department has interested Congress in authorizing
consent in compacts among the states on the subject of crime
control.60 Some of the unofficial 6l 'agencies have recently con-
centrated effort to secure the adoption of laws to permit officers
of one state, on crossing a state line into another state to pursue
and arrest a fugitive, laws which would authorize the waiver
of formal interstate rendition proceedings in the state of arrest,
laws which would enable the courts in one state to detain and
send witnesses into another state where needed in a criminal
prosecution, and laws to authorize the supervision by the author-
ities of the state which a paroled person has entered from
another state where he was convicted. 2
There is no question but that much duplication of policing
prevails in this country, and another device for cooperation and
the elimination of unnecessary duplication of personnel is the
use of state officials for enforcement of national laws. Under
this plan the state and local police are commissioned to admin-
ister national laws, not in the capacity of state officers, nor of
national commission, but rather in a dual or federal capacity.
They thus become the agents of both. There are numerous
examples of this kind of cooperation. The method was practiced
under the 'Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Local peace officers
acted under warrants issued by local magistrates to apprehend
fugitive slaves and return them to their masters. Under such
a procedure the officer practiced the dictates of two governing
bodies. Although there may be some legal obstacles to this kind
60 See Smith, Police Systems in the United States, pp. 291-340.
61 Such as The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
The Interstate Commission on Crime, and The Couneil of State Goavernments.
62 John H. Wigmore, "IState Cooperation for Crime Bepression"1, 28 Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology (1937), pp. 327-34.
(VOL 39
CRIME CONTROL
of cooperation, the use of state and local officials to assist in
national law enforcement was practiced extensively in World
War II. In an early case,6 3 the Supreme Court assumed that it
was proper for the national govermnent to constitute state
'officers as its agents. It said that even though the general
government was in some respects superior to and independent of
the state governments and could enforce its laws through its
own officers, the general government had been in the habit of
using the officers, tribunals, and institutions of the states as
its agents, but only with their consent. Such a use was not in
violation of any principle of the supremacy of the national
government, but was a matter of convenience and a saving of
expense. "The laws of the union may permit this agency, but
it is.by no means clear that they can compel it"64
In Robertson v. Baldwin the Court held that
* . . Congress is still at liberty to authorize the judicial officers of the
several states to exercise such power as is ordinarily given to officers of
courts not of record; such for instance, as the power to take affidavits,
to arrest and commit for trial offenders against the laws of the United
States; to naturalize aliens, and to perform such other duties as may
be regarded as incidental to the judicial power rather than a part of
the judicial power itself.65
State courts which act as agents for the national government
serve to exercise authority of the national government- and
must be bound by its actions in accordance with national law.66
In Kentucky v. Dennison it was stated that Congress might
authorize a particular state officer to perform a particular duty,
but it made it clear that no force could be applied to compel
a state officer to act. If the national government had that
power, it might overload the officer with duties which would
fill up all his time and disable him from performing his obliga-
tions to the state. It might, indeed, impose duties upon him of
a character which would be incompatible with "the rank and
dignity to which he was elevated by the State."' 67 It did not
63 Wayman v. Sodthard, 10 Wheaton 1 (1825). Also, Prigg V. Pennsylvania, 16
Peters 539 (1842); U. S. v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 (1883); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U. S. 275 (1897).
64 Wayman . Southard, 39, 40.
65 165 U. S. 275 (1896), 279.
66 U. S. v. Jones.
67 Op. cit., 108. On the other hand, see the recent case of Testa v. Katt, decided
March 10, 1947, reported in Law Ed., Adv. Ops., vol. 91, no. 10, 776. The Court held
that it could not accept the basic premise on which a state court "held that it has
no more obligation to enforce a valid penal law of the U. S. than it has to enforce
a penal law of another state or a foreign country. Such a broad assumption flies in
the face of the fact that the States of the Union constitute a nation... It eannot)
be assumed, the supremacy clause considered, that the responsibilities of a state to




deny that Congress could authorize a particular state officer to
perform a particular act, but because it might do so, it did not
mean that this officer could be forced to follow the national law.
On the other hand, some states will not permit this kind of
cooperation. These provisions prohibit a person from holding'
a state office and an office of trust or profit under the United
States.68 If he accepts the latter, he is disqualified from con-
tinuing in the capacity of the former.6 9 A national law of 1894
provided that no person receiving a salary from the national
government of more than $2500 annually could serve as a paid
state officer. 70 These restrictions seem to operate to prevent
dual enforcement by a single individual, but the latter require-
ment is statutory and would be easier to relax than a state con-
stitutional restriction. This distinction is sometimes overcome
in the interpretation of what constitutes an officer and an
employee. The Supreme Court has defined an officer of the
United States in such a manner that few state agencies cooperat-
ing with it need be adversely affected. The term office embraces
the ideas of "tenure, duration, emolument, and duties." 71 Under
average conditions in which an officer of one government serves
another the amount of pay may not be previously determined
or fixed definitely. However, these practices are not uniform
and a general rule cannot be laid down.
In recent years the state and national governments have
utilized still another technique for cooperation-the grant-in-
aid.72 This scheme has been adapted in such undertakings as
road and highway building, relief grants, education, social
security, to mention some of them. In granting these funds to
the states, the national government has voiced its demands for
the establishment of standards and uniform practices in state
administration. Grants-in-aid have not as yet found their place
in criminal law enforcement, but it is not inconceivable to con-
sider its possibilities as a method of bringing some local crime
control methods out of the mire of antiquity. Any such pro-
cedure would have to begin first with a study of conditions
within the entire country, and by a series of conferences with
state and local officials, to determine the conditions upon which
funds would be granted and the method of distributing such
funds.73
68 Notably state constitutional restrictions.
69 The opposite is true for election administration.
70 Act of July 31, 1894. 28 Stat. 205.
71 U. S. v. Hartwell, 6 Wallace 385 (1868), 393.
72 H. J. Bitterman, State and Federal Grants in Aid (New York, 1938).
73 Paul H. Sanders, "Federal Aid for, State Law Enforcement", 1 Law and Con-
temporary Problems (1934), pp. 472-83.
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Just what the future course of action will be in the relations
of the several levels of government in the field of criminal law
enforcement is not a matter of conjecture.74 The relations of
the national, state, and local officials have evidenced the basis
for and the growth of government by extensive cooperation.
No longer are the paths of lax enforcement beyond the combined
control of society under our dual system of government. While
it is true that much of the machinery of the horse and buggy
days remains, it is rapidly undergoing an overhauling and a
new model is appearing on the assembly line. Some of the diffi-
culties which naturally arise out of a division of powers over
crime control do remain, but the union of the forces of law oper-
ating within the Constitution and under the division of powers
evidence an answer to the challenge of extreme nationalists, and
to those who despair of our federal system and decentralization
of authority.
The history of the constitutional growth of criminal law
enforcement indicates an increasing interest by the national gov-
ernment and shows advancement by the state and local units. The
state and national governments alike have broken their silence
and now speak in the form of new methods of combatting crime.
The hitherto dormant segments of constitutional powers have
been awakened from an overdose of local self-government by the
adoption of new devices made possible through the developments
in scientific methods of detection and apprehension. For exam-
ple, the application of photography has made possible the wide
distribution of fingerprints of criminals and suspects. The gre.t
collection of fingerprints of the FBI can be quickly distributed
to local units by the photostatic process.
Perhaps the most important development in policing has been
the development of the personnel program. No longer are the
services of a police force so simple that they can be performed
by the average individual unless he is especially equipped to
handle the task. Personnel training programs have been adopted
in numerous metropolitan police systems, and the state police
and patrol agencies have long recognized the value of the trained
expert. Of course, much needs to be done to extend the science
of personnel administration to all units of government, for there
remain the locally elected police officials in virtually every
county in the country who possess by chance only the necessary
requirements of a trained expert.
It is only through the trained officer that the more technical
phases of police science can be applied. The layman knows little
74 See David Fellman, "ISome Consequences of Increased Federal Activity in Law
Enforcement", 35 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1944), pp. 16-33.
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about microscopic and photographic comparisons, so vital to
police science, little about the chemistry of blood analysis, often
the only clue in homicide cases, little about the value of ballistics.
Whenever new inventions have been made available to society,
many persons find use for them to further their own ends with-
out much regard for the rights of property or person. Under
these conditions it has been necessary for law enforcement
agencies to adopt new methods to cope with the present day
criminal and the one of the future.
A sizeable volume could be written upon the administrative
phases of federal cooperation in crime control. This would not
only involve the subject of constitutional theory and practice,
but also the exchange of services, the exchange of information,
and much informal aid in an extra-legal way. Such a study
might indicate that a greater extension of control by the national
government is the only way through which adequate and full
control over crime will be met. There is no question but that
there has been a vast expansion of control by the national gov-
ernment and the consequences of this increased federal activity
have made impact upon American Constitutional doctrine. In-
deed, it may have a demoralizing effect upon constitutional
morality.75
There is a tendency to expand cooperation and this is desired
by national enforcement agencies. But the future of this co-
operation must rest upon the mutual good faith of the govern-
mental agencies concerned. It is admitted that inter-agency
jealousies and struggles for supremacy are ever present prob-
lems of administration. And it is true that misunderstandings
arise whenever the officers of one "government" operate in the
territory of another. These problems are important and must
be controlled as may be permitted within human endeavor. Yet
the test of effective crime control is not only in the elimination
of human weaknesses, but also in the success of rescuing police
organizations from the mire of graft, corruption, and favoritism.
These pages have attempted to indicate the existing legal
channels through which cooperation may succeed. At the turn
of the present century many of these cooperative devices were
not seriously considered, and if they had been their legality
might well have been questioned. The rapid development of the
means of communication and transportation have necessitated
the transformation of nineteenth century methods of police oper-
ation. No longer is crime always a local matter. Yet local crime
should be handled locally as long as it remains local. It is when
75 Ib&, p. 23.
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crime becomes intrastate and interstate that the federal proc-
esses must come into play. And there seems to be room enough
in the constitutional processes for the national and state gov-
ernnents to operate together, each calling upon the other for
assistance whenever convenient and necessary.
Much remains to be done to foster full application of federal
cooperation. But that is a subject of governmental processes,
and one of legislative and administrative study, based upon the
"go ahead" signal given by the judicial branches of govern-
ment. Yet, this cooperative federalism will not mean less na-
tional direction and assistance, nor will it require national dicta-
tion. The states will continue as a laboratory for police science,
serving as the unit for the protection of life, liberty and prop-
erty, and will continue the starting point for most crime control.
The local units of government will assume a more important
role, for it is in the centers of population concentration that
much crime is bred.
Not only is the police official faced with a task of getting his
man, but the prosecuting officials as well are confronted with
perplexing tasks. Little can be done in law enforcement if crim-
inals are only caught. Something must be done with criminals
if crime is to be lessened. Likewise, our efforts should be centered
upon the causes and prevention of the urge to commit crime. In
the field of prosecution, some improvement will be necessary.
Studies made in recent years show that much is to be desired in
the whole process of prosecutions. Many jurisdictions are lax
in prosecutions, and criminals do not overlook that factor. New
controls must be exercised over the excessive independence of
the local prosecutor in those regions where the ratio of crime
to successful prosecutions favors the former. Prosecution fail-
ures are often the heart of the difficulties in successful crime
control. And prosecutors are sometimes dishonest and some are
forgetful of duty. They generally operate in a small domain in
which they are relatively supreme. Removals are not an easy
task.7 6
The future in legislation will mean more uniform state laws,
the reform of state criminal codes, the use of interstate coopera-
tive devices, the development of closer state and local operations
with an exchange of services, and the promotion of good will
among all enforcement officials. These should make possible the
fullest exercise of legal powers sanctioned, and cooperative fed-
eralism should bridge the span of limited jurisdictions and
limited authority.
76 J. G. Heinberg and A. C. Breckenridge, Law Enforcenwnt in Missoud (1942),
pp. 73 ff.,
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